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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
CASE NO.

vs.

920531-CA

Priority 2

SONNY GARCIA,
Defendant and Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of Unlawful Possession of a
Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a second degree
felony, Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent
to Distribute, a third degree felony in violation of Section 5837-8 (1) (iv) of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended and
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor in
violation of Section 58-37a-5 (1) Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended.

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this

matter pursuant to Section 78-2a-3 (2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953
as amended.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the trial court err in finding that the magistrate had
probable cause to issue the search warrant?

The duty of the

reviewing court is to ensure that the magistrate had a
substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.
Because this court, like the reviewing court below, is bound by
the contents of the affidavit, it need not defer to the trial
court's finding, but rather, makes an independent review of the

trial court's determination of the sufficiency of the written
evidence.

However, in reviewing the magistrate's determination

of the sufficiency of the affidavit, this court is obliged to pay
great deference to the finding of probable cause and does not
make a de novo review.

State v. Weaver, 817 P.2d 83 0 (Utah App.

1991)

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
Amendment IV, Constitution of the United States
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
Article I, Section 14, Constitution of Utah
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to
be seized.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-23-3, 1953 as amended
11

(1) A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable
cause supported by oath or affirmation particularly
describing the person or place to be searched and the
person, property or evidence to be seized."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 27, 1991, defendant, Sonny Garcia and co-defendant
Elizabeth Anderson, were charged by information with Unlawful
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a
second degree felony in violation of Section 58-37-8 (1) (a) (iv)
2

U.C.A. as amended, Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance
with Intent to Distribute, a third degree felony in violation of
Section 58-37-8 (1) (a) (iv) U.C.A. 1953, as amended and
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a Class B Misdemeanor, in
violation of Section 58-37a-5 (1) U.C.A. 1953, as amended.
On June 10, 1991, following preliminary hearing and bindover
to the First Judicial District Court, defendant filed a Motion to
Supress, which was denied.

Defendant filed an interlocutory

appeal of that decision which was denied on February 19, 1992.
During the course of pre-trial proceedings, defendant absconded
from the jurisdiction of the Court and has not yet been located.
On July 16, 1992, defendant was tried in absentia and convicted
by a jury on all counts.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On February 27, 1991, First Judicial Circuit Court Judge
Clint Judkins issued a search warrant authorizing search of Room
#211, at the Days Inn Motel in Logan, Utah, at anytime of the day
or night.

The warrant was issued based upon a supporting

affidavit, a copy of which is attached as Addendum A, which
contained the following information:
a.

On January 29, 1991, investigating officers received

information from an anonymous source that Elizabeth Anderson and
an individual known as "Sonny" were transporting marijuana from
Arizona to Utah and were distributing it in Cache Valley.

The

anonymous source indicated that the two individuals were residing
at the Days Inn Motel in Logan, Utah.
3

The affidavit does not

indicate whether the confidential informant is an ordinary
citizen or a police informant.

The affidavit does not indicate

the basis of knowledge of the informant, nor does it supply any
information with regard to the reliability or veracity of said
informant.

In short, no information is provided regarding the

informant.
b.

Officers commenced an investigation based upon this tip

and determined the following:
A 1987 blue Buick located at the Days Inn parking lot
was registered to Elizabeth Anderson.
On December 24, 1991, Elizabeth Anderson rented Room
211 at the Days Inn and paid approximately $1500 in cash for the
room since that date.
Anderson.

A male hispanic occupied the room with Ms.

These two individuals were occasionally absent from

the motel for three to four days at a time.
A subpoena duces tecum obtained by officers for the
outgoing phone calls made from Room #211 at the Day's Inn were
traced to an unlisted phone number in Tucson, Arizona.

The

affidavit does not indicate whether the investigating officers
were able to identify to whom the phone number was assigned.
During five days of surveillance which occurred two days
prior to application for the search warrant, officers observed
Elizabeth Anderson leaving Room #211 alone and driving away in
the 1987 blue Buick, observed Elizabeth Anderson leaving Room
#211 with used linen, towels and garbage and meeting the motel
maid outside the room to receive fresh towels and linen. Officers
4

did not observe an hispanic male at the residence during that
time.
Four days prior to application for the search warrant,
Elizabeth Anderson commented to the motel manager that she was
concerned that her boyfriend may have had car trouble as she had
not heard from him.
Officers traced one phone call from Elizabeth Anderson to
her mother's home in Hyrum, Utah, the registered address of the
1987 blue Buick.

Officers found a letter from Elizabeth Anderson

to her son in trash which had been placed on curbside for pickup
at this same location.

The letter mentioned a "Sonny" and stated

that "we will be there soon".

The letter also mentioned that

Elizabeth was dissatisfied with her job and that she was trying
to find a different job.

The letter was postmarked from Phoenix,

Arizona, but had as a return address, Elizabeth's mother's
residence in Hyrum, Utah.

The affidavit does not disclose the

date the officer found the letter, nor the date of the letter or
the postmark.

The letter had in fact been postmarked December

,

1990.
A criminal history check of Elizabeth Anderson showed two
prior narcotic arrests.

The affidavit indicated that Ms.

Anderson had been arrested in 1987 for possession of a controlled
substance and in 1983, for possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute and possession of marijuana.

It was determined at the

suppression hearing that the dates of Ms. Anderson's previous
arrests were actually 1977 and 1983.
5

The affidavit did not

disclose the ultimate disposition of those arrests.

Both cases

had in fact been dismissed.
Cache County Sheriff, Sid Groll, arrested Ms. Anderson in
1983 and stated that during his investigation he had received
information that Ms. Anderson was a large supplier of narcotics
in the Cache County Area.

This information was at least eight

years old at the time officers applied for this search warrant.
The affidavit, however, does not indicate that the information
supplied by Sid Groll was based upon information received eight
years earlier.
On February 26, 1991, the day prior to the issuance of the
search warrant, officers observed a male hispanic, approximately
35 years of age, residing with Ms. Anderson.

On that same date,

officers observed a white female enter Room 211 at the Day's Inn
and exit approximately one minute later.

This female left the

Days Inn parking lot and was followed to two different locations.
At each of these locations she knocked, went inside, exited after
only a few minutes and left.

Officers then lost surveillance of

that individual.
Based on the allegations contained in the affidavit, a
search warrant was issued on February 27, 1991.

Pursuant to the

search warrant, officers seized marijuana, white pills and other
contraband.
On February 27, 1991, shortly after execution of the first
warrant, officers obtained a second warrant to search a storage
unit and the 1987 blue Buick.

The grounds for the second search
6

warrant were based on items and information obtained by officers
in executing the first search warrant.
A Motion to Supress was filed by defense counsel on June 10,
1991.

Said Motion was denied by the First Judicial District

Court Judge on December 31, 1991. Counsel for the defendants
filed an interlocutory appeal which was denied by the Appellate
Court on February 19, 1992.
On June 25, 1992, Defendant was convicted of Unlawful
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a
second degree felony, Unlawful Possession of a Controlled
Substance with Intent to Distribute, a third degree felony and
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a Class B Misdemeanor.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The affidavit used to support issuance of the search warrant
was deficient in a number of respects.

First, the affidavit

relies, in part, upon the conclusory tip of an anonymous
informant, for whom there is no independent showing of veracity,
reliability or basis of knowledge.

Accordingly, the affidavit

failed under the earlier Aquilar-Spinelli standards and defendant
requests this Court to hold that those standards apply to an
analysis under Article 1, section 14 of the Utah State
Constitution.
Corroborating information obtained by independent police
investigation confirmed, in part, the anonymous informant's tip.
However, the information failed to establish with a fair
probability that contraband would be discovered in the particular
7

location and on the particular date recited in the search
warrant.

Further, the affidavit contained false and misleading

statements, which when removed further erode the finding of
probable cause.
ARGUMENT 1: THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S MOTEL ROOM VIOLATED THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE 1,
SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND SECTION 77-23-3 OF THE
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
The Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 14, guarantees the
citizens of the State of Utah freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person
or thing to be seized.1'
The Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-23-3, 1953 as amended
likewise states:
"(1) A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable
cause supported by oath or affirmation particularly describing
the person or place to be searched and the person, property or
evidence to be seized."
The interpretation of the protections provided by these
provisions has historically been based upon the interpretation
given by the United States Supreme Court to the similar provision
contained in the fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution:
8

"Article 1, section 14 of the Utah Constitution reads nearly
verbatim with the fourth amendment, and thus this Court has never
drawn any distinctions between the protections afforded by the
respective constitutional provisions. Rather, the Court has
always considered the protections afforded to be one and the
same."
State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1988)
However, the Supreme Court of Utah, in State v. Larocco,
794 P.2d 460, 465 (Utah 1990) has indicated it's willingness to
diverge from United States's Supreme Court's interpretation of
the fourth amendment in the appropriate case:
'In State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988), this court
explained that because of the similarity between article I,
section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the fourth amendment of
the United States Constitution, we have not in the past drawn any
distinctions between the protections respectively afforded by
them. Id. at 1221. We then noted, however, that "we have by no
means ruled out the possibility of doing so in some future case"
since " choosing to give the Utah Constitution a somewhat
different construction may prove to be an appropriate method for
insulating this state's citizens from the vagaries of
inconsistent interpretations given to the fourth amendment by the
federal courts.Id. at n. 8."'
Although the Larocco case dealt with an automobile search,
the Court of Appeals has on several occasions left open the
possibility that, in the appropriate case, an independent state
constitutional analysis could be applied to challenge the
sufficiency of an affidavit used to support issuance of a search
warrant.

See e.g., State v. Buford, 82 0 P.2d 13 81 (Utah App.

1991) and State v. Weaver, 817 P.2d 830 (Utah App. 1991).
In the instant case, defendant briefed and argued the State
Constitutional analysis at the trial court level.

See

Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress.
Further, First District Court Judge Low held that the affidavit
9

failed under the Acruilar-Spinelli standard.

Accordingly, this

Court is presented with the opportunity to decide whether the
Utah Constitution provides protections which are more expansive
than the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution in
the context of a search conducted pursuant to a warrant issued,
in part, on information provided by an anonymous source.
Under Aquilar-Spinelli, affidavits based on informants' tips
must set out underlying circumstances sufficient to (1) reveal
the basis of an informant's knowledge, and (2) establish the
veracity of the informant or, alternatively, the reliability of
his report in a particular case.

See Aguilar v. Texas,378 U.S.

108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed. 2d 723 (1964) and Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584 21 L.Ed. 637 (1969).
Justice Stewart in his dissenting opinion in State v.
Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 1985) points out the
significance and benefit of the Aguilar-Spinelli standards:
"Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed. 2d
723 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct.
584, 21 L.Ed. 2d 637 (1969), infuse the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement with vitality by requiring that an affidavit in
support of an application for a warrant reveal that there is a
reasonably reliable basis in fact for a finding of probable cause
to support issuance of a warrant. This requirement is the only
real protection that citizens have against an agent of the state
intruding on the privacy of their homes and effects on only the
slightest pretext, or even no pretext at all. The basis of the
affiant's knowledge must be set forth in the affidavit together
with some evidence supporting the veracity of the informant when
the affidavit includes allegations of a confidential informant.
Without such a foundation, a warrant becomes a mere charade, and
the basic liberty protected by the Fourth Amendment would
constitute an unenforceable right, or, more realistically stated,
no right at all."
Justice White, in his concurring opinion in Illinois v.
10

Gates, 462 US 213, 76 L Ed 2d 527, 103 S Ct 2317, indicates that
it was unnecessary for the United States Supreme Court to
overturn Acruilar-Spinelli, as the standards established in those
cases, provided that an informant's tip which was in and of
itself insufficient to establish probable cause, might yet be
used to establish probable cause, and further expresses concern
over the possible erosion of the probable cause standard:
"As shown above, it is not at all necessary to overrule
Aguilar-Spinelli in order to reverse the judgment below.
Therefore, because I am inclined to believe that, when applied
properly, the Aguilar-Spinelli rules play an appropriate role in
probable-cause determinations, and because the Court's holding
may foretell an evisceration of the probable-cause standard, I do
not join the Court's holding."
Id. at 570.
The Supreme Court of Washington in State v. Jackson, 688
P.2d 136 (Wash 1984), explains and supports its decision not to
"...follow, blindly, the lead of the United State Supreme
Court.." in rejecting the Aguilar-Spinelli standards:
"The Gates totality of the circumstances approach lacks
sufficient specificity and analytical structure to adequately
inform magistrates as to the appropriate standards required to
protect the right of privacy secured by Const, art. 1, Section 7.
Thus, we decline the State's invitation to follow the United
States Supreme Court's lead in abandoning well-established
protections against unreasonable searches." Id. at 143.
Under the facts of this case, the information supplied by
the confidential informant failed to establish the credibility or
basis of knowledge of the informant.
that

tl

The affidavit merely states

On or about January 29, 1991, information was received from

an anonymous source that Elizabeth Anderson and her boyfriend,
only known by "Sonny" are transporting marijuana from Arizona to
11

Utah and distributing it in Cache Valley.

They are currently

residing at the Day's Inn Motel in Logan Utah."

The affidavit

provides no information as to the status of the informant, the
basis of knowledge of the informant or the reliability of the
informant.

Further, although some of the statements of the

anonymous informant were corroborated by police, there is still
insufficient information, under the Acruilar-Spinelli

standard,

to establish the informant's basis of knowledge or to ensure
informant's credibility, reliability or veracity.

First District

Court Judge Gordon Low acknowledges this fact in his memorandum
decision, attached hereto as Addendum B:
"There is little question that under the older "two-pronged"
test enunciated in Spennille vs. United States, (sic) 393 U.S.
210, (1969) and Augilar vs. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), the
affidavit is deficient. The "two-pronged" test requires:
1,
revealing of the informant's "basis of knowledge" and
2.
providing of sufficient facts to establish the informant's
"veracity" or "reliability". Nothing in the affidavit reveals
anything about either except that he or she is anonymous. Wlr
anonymity, what relationship existed between the information c-.id
the defendant, whether there was observation, involvement, or
rumor or what ever that formed the basis of the knowledge is
absent. Nor is any information furnished by the officer directly
relating to the informant's "reliability or veracity".
Under Acruilar and Spennillie supra (sic) our inquiry would
stop there, the affidavit would fail, and the evidence would be
suppressed."
Memorandum of Gordon R. Low, Page 2.
Defendant urges the Court to apply the Aguilar-Spinelli
standards to the Utah Constitution and to suppress the evidence
seized.
ARGUMENT 2. THE AFFIDAVIT FAILS TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE
UNDER THE TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES
"Before issuing a search warrant, a neutral magistrate must
12

review an affidavit containing specific facts sufficient to
support a finding of probable cause."

State v Purser 828 P.2d

515 (Utah 1992), ritina State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 990 (Utah
1989).

The magistrate must not merely ratify the bare

conclusions of others. Id. at 517, citing, Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 239, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2333, 76 L.Ed. 2d 527 (1983)
remaining citations omitted.

"The magistrate's task is to decide

"whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit
before him, including the 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of
persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found
in a particular place." Id. at 517, remaining citations omitted.
Upon appellate review, this Court must examine the search warrant
affidavit "in its entirety and in a common-sense fashion," State
v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 1985).

Factors to

consider in determining whether probable cause exists include an
informant's veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge. See,
State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1987); State v. Brown,
798 P. 2d 284, 286 (Utah App. 1990)
State v. Purser, supra, at 517, details the factors which
should be considered in making a determination as to whether an
affidavit contains sufficient information to support a finding of
probable cause:
In some cases, the circumstances may require the supporting
affidavit to set forth in detail the basis of knowledge, veracity
and reliability of a person supplying information in order to
establish probable cause. State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203, 1205
(Utah 1984) . In other cases, if the circumstances as a whole
demonstrate the truthfulness of the informant's report, a less
13

strong showing is required. Id. at 1205-6. For example,
reliability and veracity are generally assumed when the informant
is a citizen who receives nothing from the police in exchange for
the information. See Bailey, 675 P.2d at 1206; Brown, 798 P. 2d
at 287; State v.Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 57-58 (Utah App. 1989),
cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). Courts have also
consistently approved the issuance of search warrants where an
informants's knowledge is based on personal observation. See
Hansen, 732 P.2d at 130; Brown, 798 P.2d at 287; Stromberq, 783
P. 2d at 57. Further buttressing reliability is the detail with
which the informant describes the facts set forth in the
affidavit and independent corroboration of the significant facts
See Anderson, 701 P.2d at 1102; Bailey, 675 P.2d at 1206; Brown,
798 P.2d at 287."
In the instant case, there is no information on the status
of the informant.

We do not know whether the informant is a

citizen or police informant.
informant is not assumed.

Accordingly, the reliability of the

Further, the informant did not provide

information which was based upon personal observation.
Accordingly, the information is not inherently reliable.
Finally, the informant provided very little detail in describing
facts set forth in the affidavit.

On the contrary, the

informant's statements are conclusory and general in nature.

The

informant provides no information describing the 'basis of his or
her knowledge'.

In this case, we do not know how or where the

informant obtained his or her information.

Therefore, the basis

of knowledge under the 'totality-of-circumstances' has not been
met.

The affidavit does not indicate whether the informant had

previously been reliable.

Therefore, the reliability aspect of

the 'totality of circumstances' test has not been met.
The only way to establish the reliability, veracity and
basis of knowledge of this informant is to establish whether
police independently corroborated facts which were sufficient to
14

overcome the above-described deficiencies and which establish
"fair probability that the evidence sought actually exists and
can be found where the informant so states."

State v. Anderson

701 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1985)
Police confirmed that a blue Buick located at the Day's Inn
parking lot was registered to Elizabeth Anderson.

The hotel

management confirmed that a Liz Anderson had rented a room at the
Day's Inn Motel since December 24, 1990. Hotel management also
confirmed that a male hispanic was living in the room with Ms.
Anderson.

The police thus verified that Elizabeth Anderson and a

male hispanic were residing at the Days Inn Motel.

However:

"Corroboration of public or innocuous facts only shows that
the informer has some familiarity with the suspect's
affairs. Such corroboration only justifies an inference
that the informer has some knowledge of the suspect and his
activities, not that criminal activity is occurring.
Corroboration of the informer's report is significant only
to the extent that it tends to give substance and verity to
the report that the suspect is engaged in criminal
activity."
State v.Jackson, supra, at 140.
The second aspect of the informant's information was that
the Elizabeth Anderson and her boyfriend were involved in
transporting drugs from Arizona to Cache Valley and distributing
them in the Cache Valley area.

The police point to the following

information as corroborating that statement:
1.

Elizabeth Anderson paid for her room in cash.

not appear to have employment in the area.

She did

She mailed a letter

to her son from Arizona but used her mother's Hyrum address as
the return address.

On more than one occasion, Ms. Anderson met
15

the motel maid outside of her room to receive fresh linens and to
return her used linens.
2.

A subpoena duces tecum was obtained for outgoing phone

calls made from room #211 at the Day's Inn in Logan.

Several

phone calls were traced to an unlisted phone number in Tucson,
Arizona.
3.

A criminal history check revealed, according to the

affidavit, that Ms. Anderson had a previous narcotics arrest in
1983 and 1987. (This information was inaccurate and will be
discussed below)

Sid Groll, Cache county Sheriff, indicated that

when he investigated Ms. Anderson ten years earlier, "he had
received information that Elizabeth Anderson was a large supplier
of drugs in the Cache County area."
4. Surveillance on February 26, 1991 revealed a male
hispanic was residing with Elizabeth Anderson.

On that same

date, police observed a female enter the room and leave
approximately 1 minute later.

The female then went to two other

Logan residences entered for a few minutes and left.
The difficulty with the information provided by the
informant and the independent police investigation is that it is
as consistent with innocent as with criminal conduct and does not
indicate with fair probability that controlled substances either
exist or can be located at the Day's Inn Motel on the date and at
the time of issuance of the search warrant.

No one has seen

controlled substances at this location, there is no indication
that either police or the confidential informant ever observed
16

either of the defendant's with controlled substances at any time.
From the date of the informant's tip on January 29, 1991 to the
date of issuance of the search warrant on February 27, 1991, only
one individual was seen entering and leaving Room #211 after
being there for only a short period of time.

The individual who

entered the Motel was never stopped, investigated or searched so
as to discover whether she had in fact purchased controlled
substances from the defendant.

In fact, the appearance of this

one individual is the sole indication that drugs may have been
distributed from that location.

There is no indication that

defendant's boyfriend was making a 'drug run' so as to establish
that drugs would be found at the Days Inn on the date the warrant
was executed.
In State v. Droneburq, 781 P.2d 1303 (Utah App. 1989), the
Garfield County Sheriff received information that methamphetamine
was to be delivered to a residence in Panguitch, Utah on April
28, 1987, between 2:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m.

As in the instant

case, the affidavit was totally lacking in any information on the
reliability, veracity or basis of knowledge of the confidential
informant.

The State nonetheless argued that the sheriff

corroborated sufficient additional information prior to execution
of the warrant to establish probable cause. The Court denied the
State's argument stating that:
"Partial corroboration of this deficient information does
not transform the underlying facts and circumstances into
probable cause. Without the requisite probable cause, grounds
for a warrantless vehicle search under the Carroll doctrine were
never established." Droneburq at 1306.
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In other cases in which the Utah Appellate Courts have
upheld the sufficiency of an affidavit used to support issuance
of a search warrant, the affidavits have contained far more
information than existed in the present case:
In State v Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1983), the
informant personally observed the marijuana at the location where
the search was ultimately conducted.

In the present case,

neither the informant nor the investigating officers ever
observed contraband of any kind.
In State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1983), the
informant had previously provided reliable information, the same
information had been received independently by a second officer
and from another informant who had previously provided reliable
information, the information provided by the informant was
detailed and officers verified significant facts.

In the present

case, there is no information regarding informant's prior
reliability and the tip itself was conclusory and general in
nature.
In State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 (Utah 1987), the informant
previously provided reliable information and personally observed
large quantities of marijuana being sold in smaller quantities at
the defendant's residence five days prior to issuance of the
search warrant.

The Supreme Court pointed out that this

information was not "...some remote hearsay or assumption based
upon circumstantial evidence." Hansen at 130.

In the present

case, the information in the affidavit is based, in significant
18

measure, upon hearsay and circumstantial evidence.
In State v. Stromberq, 783 P.2d 54 (Utah App. 1989), the
informant personally observed marijuana and marijuana
paraphernalia in defendant's home on numerous occasions and the
informant was a "citizen informant" whose veracity is assumed.
In the instant case, the status of the informant is unknown.
In State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284 (Utah App. 1990), a citizen
informant identified himself to Crime Solvers, personally
observed marijuana in possession of children, gave a detailed
description of the greenhouse and houses where the marijuana was
alleged to have been located and police independently observed
what appeared to be marijuana at the location described by the
defendant.
In State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515 (Utah App. 1992), the
informant's information was based upon personal observation, the
informant assisted law enforcement officers in performing two
drug buys from defendant's home within ten days prior to the
filing of the affidavit, the information was detailed and was
independently corroborated by police officers and police observed
numerous persons entering defendant's home and leaving shortly
thereafter.
In sum, although the corroborated information in the instant
case may have lead police to suspect the defendants of drug
distribution, those suspicions were insufficient to establish a
fair probability that controlled substances would be found in
Room #211 at the Days Inn Motel on the date and at the time the
19

warrant was executed.
ARGUMENT 3. THE SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT IS DEFECTIVE BECAUSE IT
CONTAINS FALSE AND MISLEADING INFORMATION REGARDING DEFENDANTS
CRIMINAL HISTORY
The affidavit used to support issuance of the first and
second search warrants herein, represented that Elizabeth
Anderson had two prior narcotics arrests in 1987 and 1983.

In

fact, the defendant was arrested for possession of a controlled
substance in 1977, fourteen years prior to issuance of the search
warrant.

The affidavit is silent regarding the fact that both

charges were ultimately dismissed.

Judge Low held in his

Memorandum decision, attached hereto as Addendum -- that:
"There is no question that the 1987 date as found in
paragraph 3(e) on the affidavit was erroneous and should have
been correctly typed 1977."
"If the defendant claims intentional misstatements or
omissions or reckless disregard for the truth in the affidavit, a
hearing must be held.

If the court agrees with the defendant's

characterization, the court must then determine whether probable
cause exists after excising such misstatements."

State v.Buford,

820 P.2d 1381, 1385 (Utah App. 1991) at 1385, citing, Franks v.
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171-72, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2684-85, 57
L.Ed.2d 667 (1978) .
If the erroneous portion of this affidavit is removed, the
reviewing Court is left with information that Elizabeth Anderson
had a prior narcotics arrest, nine and fourteen years prior to
application for the warrant:.

While that information can be

considered under the totality of the circumstances, certainly, it
20

can not be accorded great weight in determining the probability
that defendant is currently in possession of or distributing
controlled substances.
ARGUMENT 3. THE SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT IS DEFECTIVE BECAUSE IT
CONTAINS STALE INFORMATION
Police claim they corroborated the informant's statement
that defendant's were transporting drugs from Arizona, in part,
by referencing a letter written by Elizabeth Anderson to her son
which contained an Arizona postmark.

However, the letter was

postmarked November 23, 1990, some three months prior to
execution of the search warrant.

Further, the date of the

postmark was not included in the affidavit itself.
Additionally, the information provided in paragraph 3(e) of
the affidavit indicates that Cache County Sheriff, Sid Groll,
investigated Elizabeth Anderson in 1983 and "received
information" that she was a "large supplier of narcotics in the
Cache County area."
years old.

This information is approximately eight

Further, there is no information regarding the source

of Sheriff Groll's information, nor is there information
regarding the reliability and basis of knowledge of the
individual provided that information to the sheriff.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, defendant respectfully requests that
this Court reverse the decision of the trial court, suppress the
evidence seized as a result of issuance of this warrant and grant
defendant a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this

day of May, 1993.

Barbara King L^phmar
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the
above and foregoing Brief of Appellant were mailed, postage
prepaid, to counsel for the Plaintiff/Appellee, Jan Graham,
Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84114 on the 13th day of May, 1993.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

RKHrPTT '-'n*

FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
vs.

AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT

ELIZABETH ANDERSEN and
"SONNY"
Day's Inn
Room #211
Logan, UT 84321

Criminal No,

Defendant

I, Greg Ridler, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

That Affiant is an Investigator with the Logan City Police
Department.
That Affiant has been with the Police
Department for over 7 years, and is currently assigned to
the Investigation Division and the Tri-County Narcotic
Strike Force, Affiant's training and responsibility is to
investigate all types of narcotic offenses.

2.

That Affiant investigated alleged offense of Distribution of
a Controlled Substance.
This investigation was assisted in
by Det. Dennis Simonson who has over 20 years experience as
a police officer and is currently assigned to the Tri-County
Narcotics Strike Force and has received training in the area
of narcotic offenses and surveillance.

3.

The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search
Warrant are:
a.

On or about January 29, 1991, information was received
from an anonymous source that EJizabeth Andersen and
her boyfriend, only known by ,fSonny" are transporting
marijuana from Arizona to Utah and distributing it in
Cache Valley. They are currently residing at the Dayfs
Inn Motel in Logan Utah.

A 1987 blue Buick was located at the Day's Inn parking
lot with a Utah's license plate of 980DFC. A records
check showed the name of Elizabeth Andersen of 238 East
Main in Hyrum as the registered owner. Hotel
management confirmed that a Liz Andersen had rented
room #211 at the Day's Inn in Logan, Utah. According
to the management, Elizabeth Andersen has rented the
room since December 24, 1990 and has paid a bill for
approximately $1,500.00 in cash for the use of the
room. Also a male hispanic has occupied the room with
Elizabeth Anderson. Motel management reports that the
male has never signed for the room or provided any
information to identify him. Hotel management also
reports that on occasion the occupants have been absent
for 3 - 4 days at a time, even though the room has been
paid for. /A subpoena duces tecum has been attained for
the outgoing phone calls made from room #211 at the
Day's Inn in Logan. Several phone calls were traced to
an unlisted phone number in Tucson, Arizona.
Surveillance was set up on room #211 by Det. Dennis
Simonson.
From February 20, 1991 to February 25, 1991
no male hispanic was observed at the room.
On
occasion Elizabeth Andersen would leave the room and
drive away by herself in the 1987 blue Buick.
Elizabeth Andersen was also observed leaving her room
with used linen, towels and garbage and meeting the
motel maid outside the room and receiving fresh towels
and linen, thus preventing the maid from entering the
room.
According to the motel managment, this has
happened on several other occasions. On February 23,
1991 Elizabeth Andersen commented to the motel manager
that she was worried about her boyfriend that he might
have had car trouble and that she had not heard from
him.
During the time of surveillance, it did not
appear that Elizabeth Andersen had employment in the
area and would only leave the motel to perform minor
errands or to visit friends.
Another phone call made from the motel was to an Alma
Clark-Millard of 238 East Main in Hyrum, Utah, the same
address on the Buick' s registration. Alma ClarkMillard has been identified as Elizabeth Andersen's
mother. Det. Simonson received Mrs. Millard's trash
after having been placed on the curbside for for
pickup. Among the items found in the trash was a
letter addressed to a Steven James Andersen of 238
East Main in Hyrum, Utah. The letter was written by
Elizabeth Andersen to Steven, who is her son. The
letter mentioned a ,fSonny" and states that "we be there
soon". The letter also mentions they are trying to
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find a different job, wishing she had never taken this
job. The letter has the same return address as it is
addressed to, 238 East Main, Hyrum, Utah, but has a
Phoenix, Arizona postmark.

4.

e.

A criminal history check on Elizabeth Andersen shows
two prior narcotic arrests. In 1987 she was arrested
for possession of a controlled substance and in 1983
was arrested for possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute and possession of marijuana. Current Cache
County Sheriff, Sid Groll, who arrested Elizabeth
Andersen in 1983, states that during his investigation
he had received information that Elizabeth Andersen was
a large supplier of narcotics in the Cache County area.

f.

Surveillance on February 26, 1991 revealed a male
hispanic approximately 35 years of age, black hair,
moustache, now residing in room #211 with Elizabeth
Andersen. Elizabeth Andersen spoke to the hotel clerkm
and indicated that her boyfriend had returned. Also on
February 26, 1991 a vehicle driven by a white female
was observed to go up to room #211. The female knocked
and was admitted to the room. The female left
approximately 1 minute later and exited the motel
parking lot in her vehicle.
The female was then
followed to two different Logan residences where she
knocked, went inside and came out after only a few
minutes and left.
After the second residence, an
unsuccessful attempt was made to follow her further.

Affiant has reason to believe, based on the above
information and over a combined 27 years of experience and
training between Det. Simonson and Ridler, that the persons
known as Elizabeth Andersen and "Sonny" are involved in the
distribution of controlled substances. The anonymous
information is supported by the facts that Elizabeth
Andersen is staying at the Day's Inn with a boyfriend by the
name of "Sonny" who has Arizona connections.
A large
amount of cash was paid for the motel room by Elizabeth
Andersen who also lists a local Hyrum residence. No
evidence can be found of Elizabeth Andersen's employment and
her boyfriend is believed to have been out of town over the
last several days.
Elizabeth Andersen continually refuses
entry to the hotel maid, and a letter addressed by Elizabeth
to her son in Hyrum intentionally had the return address
deleted. Both of these actions are abanormally secretive.
Upon return of the male hispanic, believed to be "Sonny", a
female visited the room and was observed to act in a way
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consistent with narcotic deliveries. With this information
that in room #211 and in a 1987 blue Buick, Utah plate
980DFC, there is now certain
property described as:
Marijuana material, other controlled substances, tools,
devices, instruments or written documents pertaining to
or related to the use of, possession of, controlled
substances which is prohibited by the Utah Controlled
Substance Act. ' Also dominion and control papers,
effects, keys., rent receipts, bills for utility
services, answering machine tapes, photographs, and
other items which tends to prove ownership and/or
control of the residence;
which property or evidence:
was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed,
and has been used to commit or conceal a public
offense, and is being possessed with the purpose to use
it as a means of committing or concealing a public
offense, and consists of an item or constitutes
evidence of illegal conduct, possessed by a party to
the illegal conduct.
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above
is evidence of the crime of Distribution of Controlled
Substances, to wit marijuana.
Which is in violation of
Section 58-37-8, U.C.A. as amended.
WHEREFORE, the Affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued
for the seizure of said items at any time day or night. It
is further requested that the officers executing the
requested warrant not be required to give notice of the
officer's authority or purpose because: physical harm may
result to any person if notice were given; or the property
sought may quickly be destroyed, disposed of, or secreted.
This danger is believed to exist because: Affiant's past
experience and knowledge is that evidence can be quickly
disposed of if our authority or purpose is announced.

4

1
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS 2f TH D
1991.

OF FEBRUARY

JUDGE
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
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ADDENDUM B

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

]

Plaintiff

]

vs.

]i

MEMORANDUM DECISION

ELIZABETH ANDERSON and
SONNY GARCIA,

]»
]>

CASE NO. 911000029
910000028

Defendants

]

THIS MATTER IS before the Court upon joint Motion's by the
Defendants for an order suppressing the evidence obtained as a
result of a search conducted pursuant to a warrant issued by
the First Circuit Court Judge. The application for the warrant
was supported by an affidavit of a police officer.
The question before the Court is whether the issuing of
magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that there
were enough facts within the affidavit to find that probable
cause existed. Illinois vs. Gates, 462 U.S. ^ (1983), State
vs. Brown, 798 P2 d, 284 (1990), and State vs. Collard, 59 Utah
Advanced Reports 30 (1991).
lit* pe< fH 'J-Hsty'<(*•• j
The after-the-fact scrutiny by the District or Appellate
Courts does not take the form of a de novo review, but rather
reviewed with the circumstances in mind under which the
magistrate issued the warrant with great deference given to the
magistrate's determinations on probable cause. Gates supra.
The affidavit in this case is not entirely dissimilar to
that in the Gates case. Here, as there, anonymous information
was received, a follow-up investigation ensued confirming and
corroborating the facts alleged and the officers opinion was

FILED

Of C 231991
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provided that the circumstances added up to drug trafficking.
There is little question that under the older "two pronged"
test enunciated in Spennille vs. United States, 393 U.S. 210,
(1969) and Auoilar vs. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), the
affidavit is deficient. The "two pronged" test requires: 1.
revealing of the the informant's "basis of knowledge" and 2.
providing of sufficient facts to establish the informant's
"veracity" or "reliability". Nothing in the affidavit reveals
anything about either except that he or she is anonymous. Why
anonymity, what relationship existed between the informant and
the defendants, whether there was observation, involvement, or
rumor or what ever that formed the basis of the knowledge is
absent.
Nor is any information furnished by the officer
directly relating to the informant's "reliability or veracity".
Under Augilar and Spennillie supra our inquiry would stop
there, the affidavit would fail, and the evidence would be
suppressed. Under the Gates rational, which has been embraced
by the Utah Courts, (See Brown and Collard, Supra) the
"totality of the circumstances" needs to be reviewed with
respect to corroboration of the informant's tip by an
independent police investigation.
If the informant's tip is
corroborated in "major part by efforts of police" then the
magistrate is justified in relying upon said information.
Courts often classify informants in two (2) categories,
those who out of civic duty or the like inform police and those
who are police confidential informants and who have a
pecuniary, penal or some other self interest. The former are
often given a limited presumption of credibility absent
evidence of the contrary. Chambers vs. Marroni, 399 U.S. 46
(1970).
Here however, more information about the informant
must be supplied than is found in the affidavit to warrant
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the presumption.
If that information is lacking or the
identity is otherwise unknown to the police officer, then as
with the police confidential informant, the affidavit must make
or demonstrate an account of reliability.
Ordinarily the
police should provide the basis of reliability by explaining
why the informant is anonymous or confidential, showing past
performance by the informant, admissions, against his penal
interest or otherwise.
Under Gates the Courts have now recognized that independent
police investigation shown on the Affidavit can supply the
basis for reliability otherwise absent. As to the "basis of
knowledge", even though Gates held it unnecessary for the
police officer to always make and set forth separate facts
thereon, the Court still held that it is a "highly relevant"
consideration. In this case no information was supplied in
that regard. The affidavit recited that on the 29th day of
January, 1991, an anonymous source stated that the Defendants
were [are] transporting marijuana from Arizona into Utah and
distributing it in Cache Valley and that they were [are]
residing in the Days Inn Motel in Logan, Utah.
The investigation confirmed the Defendants1 occupancy of
the motel, their connection with Arizona, unusual living
conditions, arrival and departure of persons consistent with
drug trafficking,
earlier
drug
involvement by Defendant
Anderson, payment of rent bills by substantial sums of cash,
and overall unusual activity such as living in a motel instead
of an apartment or home despite local ties, including Defendant
Anderson's own child and mother living only a few miles away.
With all of this the police officer opined that with the
combined 27 years of the affiant and the detective assisting
him in the the investigation of drug offenses that the
Defendants
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were involved in drug trafficking.
Obviously a magistrate
cannot rely solely upon the conclusions of the
affiant to
establish probable cause, however, where the affiant has been
shown to possess special knowledge or training the opinion may
contribute to the finding of probable cause.
Further,
the
information
supplied
by the
anonymous
confidential informant in this case, though not as specific and
detailed as that found in Gates, nevertheless it is far more
detailed than "casual rumor circulating in the underworld...
or... a "general reputation". Spennille supra.
Of major concern are the problems of freshness of the
information and specificity of the dates and the resulting
conclusion that the evidence would be found at the time of the
search. In that regard the primary date of concern is that of
January 29, 1991, when the anonymous tip was provided.
The
statement was that the defendants "are" (presently, we
therefore presume) transporting and distributing the drugs in
Cache Valley. The police check of the motel revealed that the
Defendants had a habit of being "absent three-four days at a
time" and that Defendant Garcia was away much of the month of
February. The Defendant has made much of the fact that the
letter discovered in Defendant Anderson's mother trash was
written in November 1990, therefore stale by January 29, 1991,
and
hence
fails
to support the freshness requirement.
Actually, the letter confirms the Arizona connection, the
relationship between the Defendants, and the anticipated return
to Utah, thereby corroborating the anonymous source on that
information.
The return of Defendant Garcia and the drug
trafficking-like activity immediately after his return further
confirms
the
source's
information
and provides
further
information as to the likelihood of evidence being found at the
time and place of the search.
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Here, as in Gates, the follow-up investigation did much to
confirm the reported criminal conduct. The fact that most of
the conduct observed did not reveal any "criminal mischief" or
criminal activity is not critical. As under Gates it need only
corroborate the tip made by the anonymous informant, thereby
giving rise after review of the "totality of the circumstances"
to present the issuing magistrate with a basis that "a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of the crime will be
found in the particular place." From the above this Court is
unable to establish that the magistrate did not have a
substantial basis for his finding that probable cause existed.

FALSE OR MISLEADING INFORMATION

On the
day of
, 1991, an evidentiary
hearing was conducted to determine, among other things, the
correctness of the information found on the affidavit.
The defense argues that since only certain portions of the
letter found in Defendant Andersons mother's trash were
referred to, that the omissions, including the lack of the date
thereof, were misleading.
Ordinarily, when unsworn writings are referred to in the
affidavit, copies thereof should be attached. Failing to do so
however is not fatal, particularly whereas in this case the
magistrate could easily assume that the letter was fairly
recent as it was found in the Defendant's mother's trash. The
fact that the letter was over two month old does not negate the
value of the same corroborating the statement of the anonymous
source as above discussed, nor is it detrimental to the
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"freshness" issue.
II. There is no question that the 1987 date as found in
paragraph 3(e) on the affidavit was erroneous and should have
been correctly typed
1977.
The difference
however
is
unimportant as the purpose was to show prior drug involvement.
It would have been more meaningful to the magistrate with a
1987 date rather than one ten years earlier, but that is only
one factor in the overall consideration by the magistrate in
determining the existence of probable cause. Nor does the fact
that the cases against Defendant Anderson were dismissed in
1977 and in 1983 constitute an omission. A complete criminal
history and criminal litigation history was unnecessary as the
fact of dismissal may or may not have aided in the suggestion
that the Defendant had prior drug involvement.
III.
The claim that the magistrate was misled by the
language in paragraph 3(b) relative to the $1,500.00 payment is
without merit. The statement is ambiguous, but affidavits are
normally drafted by non-lawyers in the mist of a criminal
investigation.
Gates supra.
The ambiguity detracts in no
fashion from the fact that the motel bills were large and paid
in cash. Those are the salient points of the paragraph with
the resulting implication as recited in paragraph 4, that such
is not inconsistent with drug trafficking.

NIGHT TIME SEARCH

The defense has argued that the warrant is defective
because it unjustifiably authorizes a night time search. A
night time search, this Court agrees, was unjustified. The

State of Utah vs* Anderson and Garcia
#911000029 & 911000028
Page 7

evidentiary hearing revealed that the search took place in the
day time. The issue is therefore moot.

SUBPEONA DUCES TECUM

The County Attorney, by stamped signature affixed by his
secretary, issued a subpoena for certain information in the
possession of the motel manager. The Court addressed the issue
from the bench and here only confirms it by holding that: 1.
the evidence was apparently obtained before the issuance of the
subpoena; 2. that the subpoena was not obtained pursuant to
Section 77-22-1, U.C.A., et. seq., but rather pursuant to Rule
14 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; and 3. that
obtaining the information did not violate Defendant's rights of
privacy as argued by the defense. As to the standing argument
the Court would find that the Defendant would have an
expectation of privacy as well as that of Defendant Anderson,
but that his right was not unconstitutionally violated by the
police action.

SCOPE OF THE SEARCH

Defendant's have condemned the search (not the warrant) as
being overly broad as items not described in the warrant were
seized. Just what those are, if unjustified, can be properly
excluded at the time of the trial. The Court cannot rule at
this time with respect thereto.
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VIDEO

The Defendants have attacked the search as being "extremely
intrusive" to the point that "it should shock the conscience of
this Court", Though pertinent case authority in support of the
Defendants' argument and with respect to these facts in this
case is extremely light, the Court's review of the video can
only result in a denial.
Though Defendant Garcia was
completely nude at one time in the video the offensive portion
was of his own doing. Precautions were taken so that both he
and
Defendant
Anderson
could
become
modestly
attired.
Obviously, the single distasteful exposure though unnecessary
does not vitiate the whole search.
Overall, though the affidavit could have been more
detailed, could have been more explicit, and a little less
ambiguous, this Court finds that given the totality of the
circumstances that the magistrate had a substantial basis for
concluding that probable cause existed and that there was a
fair probability that a controlled substance or evidence of a
crime would be found at the place to be searched.
Dated this 23rd day of December, 1991.
')
BY THE COURT

^^

"

Gordon J. Low
District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the forgoing MEMORANDUM DECISION, postage prepaid, to the
attached list of sattorneys at the addresses set forth,
day of jX(LC/>^/).f. i ^ . 1991, at LOGAN, UTAH.
this J24
Sharon L. Hancey
DISTRICT COURT CLERK

